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Abstract: 
This chapter begins by explaining two widespread attitudes towards the methods of 
moral philosophy. The first common attitude is that the appropriate method for doing 
ethics was described by John Rawls when he formulated the reflective equilibrium 
method. Another common attitude is that moral philosophy has no method – anything 
goes in ethical theorising as long as the results are significant enough. The chapter 
then motivates the volume by arguing that these attitudes are not helpful. The 
reflective equilibrium method has its limits and yet not all ways of proceeding in 
ethics are equally good. For this reason, I argue that we need to be more aware of the 
argumentative strategies we employ in ethics. This requires being methodologically 
reflective and transparent and taking part in the debates about the merits and problems 
of different methodologies exactly in the way done in the chapters of this volume. The 
second half of the chapter then provides an outline of the other chapters. Here I focus 
on clarifying exactly how these chapters contribute to the new discussions about the 
methods of ethics. 
 
 
Background 
I often come across two different but equally perplexing attitudes towards 
methodological questions in moral philosophy. Firstly, many think that, as a 
discipline, moral philosophy has a unique method, comparable in significance to the 
‘experimental method’ of the natural sciences. This well-known reflective equilibrium 
method was first explicitly outlined by John Rawls (1951, 1974 and 1974). Many 
ethicists appear to think that knowing the basics of how the reflective equilibrium 
method works is all you need to know about how moral philosophy should be done. 
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The reflective equilibrium method is easy to outline. We must begin from judgments 
about individual cases which must be held sincerely and which must also be stable in 
the kind of careful deliberation that is not distorted by strong emotions or self-
interested bias. In the second stage, we attempt to formulate a set of general moral 
principles that could both fit and also justify the previous convictions. When we 
formulate these principles at this preliminary stage, it will be likely that there will not 
be a perfect match between our carefully considered judgments about the cases and 
the general principles.  
 
In the third stage, we then try to get rid of the previous conflicts in two ways. In some 
conflict cases, it makes sense for us to modify our judgments about the cases on the 
basis of the general principles because those principles support our intuitions so well 
elsewhere. In other cases, in contrast, it makes more sense to attempt to find new, 
more sophisticated principles so that we do not have to give up our convictions about 
the cases given how deeply held they are.  
 
Finally, in the fourth stage, we fine-tune our principles by taking into consideration 
the leading ethical theories on the topic and the best arguments made in their support. 
We are also to seek wider reflective equilibrium by broadening the set of moral and 
non-moral beliefs with which the relevant moral principles we have formulated are 
supposed to be compatible. Thus, at this final stage, we check that the latter principles 
are compatible also with what we know, for example, about what kind of social 
systems can be stable and what influences our moral judgments.  
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It is easy to see just why the reflective equilibrium is such a promising account of 
how we ought to do moral philosophy. It is an ideal that seems provide us with almost 
something like an algorithm – clear steps which anyone should be able to follow 
systemically in order to achieve moral knowledge. The description of the method also 
intuitively seems to capture something about how many moral philosophers 
themselves understand what they are doing. It is thus not surprising that majority of 
moral philosophers continue to endorse the method at least in some form.  
 
Despite this, many ethicists have always been torn about the reflective equilibrium 
method for several reasons. Firstly, there have always been many forceful objections 
to the method. One of the most poignant criticisms has always been that, even if when 
we use the reflective equilibrium method we must begin from our carefully 
considered moral judgments, these judgments are still bound to be a reflection of 
cultural indoctrination, superstition and bias (Hare 1975; Brandt 1979, pp. 21–2). As a 
consequence, whatever moral principles end up being in a reflective equilibrium with 
our carefully considered judgments, these principles will be just as unlikely to reflect 
the moral reality as the intuitions that serve as the input, or so the objection goes.  
 
Even if this objection seems to have considerable force, it has not been able to change 
that many people’s mind about the reflective equilibrium method. This is because, if 
we are not allowed to rely on our carefully considered judgments in the evaluation of 
moral principles, then we would be required to evaluate those principles from a 
completely non-moral, non-evaluative point of view.1 Yet, in this situation, it 
becomes less clear on what grounds we could be able to choose between alternative 																																																								
1 Some have suggested that, instead of carefully considered judgments about cases, we can rely on 
carefully considered judgments about more general principles (see, e.g., Singer (2005)). This responses 
assumes, however, that there is an important epistemic difference between the two kinds of judgments.  
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moral principles (Hooker 2000, p. 11). As Frank Jackson (1998, p. 135) put it, ‘we 
must start from somewhere in current folk morality, otherwise we start from 
somewhere unintuitive, and that can hardly be a good place to start.’ 
 
The reflective equilibrium method also suffers from other problems – two of which 
are relevant here. Firstly, many ethicists feel like the description of the reflective 
equilibrium method is not especially helpful when it comes to their everyday work. 
Somewhat boringly, the method merely guides us vaguely to seek coherence between 
our carefully considered moral convictions, moral principles and the relevant 
empirical beliefs. Yet, very few people have thought that incoherent views are better 
than coherent ones and more importantly the reflective equilibrium method does not 
tell us exactly how we should make our principles cohere with our carefully 
considered convictions. In any given conflict situation, is it better to give up your 
carefully considered conviction or reformulate the general principles? The method 
itself does not tell and therefore, when we make these choices, we must rely on our 
judgment. Yet, nothing in the description of the method helps us to avoid making 
mistaken judgments. 
 
The second issue is that very few recent works in moral philosophy employ the 
reflective equilibrium method in any recognisable and explicit form. One reason for 
this is that many ethicists work on questions that simply cannot be answered by using 
it. If you work in normative ethics and are searching for general principles that 
capture what kind of actions are right and wrong across different contexts, then at 
least in principle you can rely on the method. Yet, if you happen to be working on any 
of the other equally interesting and important questions in normative ethics or if you 
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are trying to solve problems in either metaethics or applied ethics, then there just does 
not seem to be any straightforward way in which you could rely on the reflective 
equilibrium method. For example, in metaethics finding a reflective equilibrium 
between our moral principles and carefully considered convictions about cases will 
tell us little about the meaning of moral concepts, the nature of moral judgments or 
the essence of moral properties. Likewise, in applied ethics, it is equally unlikely that 
the previous type of coherence between convictions and general principles could shed 
much light on which morally salient considerations should be taken into account 
when we consider the most difficult moral questions concerning the climate change, 
war, new biomedical technology and so on.   
 
Perhaps these limitations of the reflective equilibrium method have led to another 
extreme in the ethicists’ attitudes towards the methodological questions. The second 
common methodological attitude is a reflection of Paul Feyerabend’s (1975) 
‘anything goes’ view in the debates concerning the appropriate methods of science. 
The core idea behind this attitude is the observation that, if we consider both historical 
and more recent key contributions to moral philosophy, it is difficult to extract a 
unique method such that its use would explain the fact that these very contributions 
constitute the most important advances. Rather, what we seem to find from the key 
works of moral philosophy is very different kinds of arguments and so, in a sense, the 
biggest advances have been made by using very different kinds of methods. As a 
consequence, it just is not plausible that any strict methodological rules would have 
governed the growth of knowledge in moral philosophy any more than in the case of 
natural sciences. Furthermore, those who have this liberal methodological attitude 
emphasise that, given that we do not yet know how the new advances will be made in 
	 6	
the future, we should not require all ethicists to follow any strict methodological rules. 
After all, doing so would only prevent us from making important discoveries the 
making of which will also require inventing new methods.  We should thus let 
different ethicists pursue different lines of inquiry as they see fit and just see what 
works, or so the argument goes. 
 
There are several reasons for why this ‘methodological anarchism’ is not wholly 
satisfactory either. The main problem is that the attitude is based on a presupposition 
according to which different views in moral philosophy can be evaluated 
independently of the arguments provided in their support. If the evaluation of 
different theories could in this way be distinguished from the arguments that are 
provided in their support, it would make sense not to be too concerned about the 
methods of ethics. Any method would do as long as it leads to the right results.  
 
It is, however, much more appealing to think that how plausible different answers to 
different questions in moral philosophy are is always intertwined with the question of 
how strong arguments have been provided for those answers. That is, in moral 
philosophy, evaluating a philosopher’s views and the kind of arguments she has 
provided for them always go hand in hand. This is because there are no ways of 
evaluating different claims in moral philosophy that would be independent of the 
arguments made for and against those claims. One good reason for thinking that this 
is the case is that, usually when two ethicists have a substantive disagreement over 
some significant question, they equally disagree about the arguments used for 
defending those views. And, if this is the case, then it makes no sense to think that 
any way of doing moral philosophy is appropriate as long as it leads to the growth of 
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moral knowledge. The ways of proceeding that yield better arguments for the 
defended conclusions must be better than others. 
 
The ‘anything goes’ attitude can also have harmful consequences for how moral 
philosophers proceed in practice. It seems to suggest that, as moral philosophers, we 
do not need to be self-reflective: we do not need to think about the ways in which we 
pursue our research. It seems to tell us that it is enough that we try to answer our 
research questions the best we can without paying much attention to the question of 
whether the methods of inquiry we are using are sound. After all, if we happen to 
stumble upon the right answers, the methods we used can always be declared 
appropriate in retrospect in the light of the answers we came up with. Yet, surely, this 
is not the best way to proceed even for individual researchers.  
 
Rather, it is much more plausible to think that, as practicing moral philosophers, we 
should pay serious attention to how we intend to find the answers to the ethical and 
theoretical questions that interest us. Taking our methods seriously requires us, for 
example, (i) to consider the kinds of arguments that have been used before in ethics – 
what kind of structures they have and what kind of premises and presuppositions they 
begin from, (ii) to keep track of the advances in the empirical sciences that touch on 
the topics of our research, (iii) to follow and take part in the methodological debates 
within moral philosophy and (iv) to aim at making methodological innovations 
ourselves. If these recommendations sound overly demanding, one good reason for 
following them is that the most successful ethicists have always also at the same time 
been methodologically both innovative and self-aware.  
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Let me then draw three lessons from the problems of the methodological attitudes 
outlined above. Firstly, given that moral philosophers investigate very different kinds 
of questions, it is unlikely that there will be any single method of ethics that could be 
used to make progress in all debates of moral philosophy. It is unlikely that the best 
ways to approach the second-order metaphysical questions about the nature of moral 
properties are the same as the ways in which we should think about first-order 
questions such as what duties we, as individuals, have towards non-human animals. 
This suggests that, when it comes to the methods of ethics, we should be 
methodological pluralists rather than monists. Even if it is not the case that anything 
goes, there will be a number of different and equally appropriate methods which 
ethicists should be able to rely on with confidence depending on what kind of 
questions they are investigating. 
 
The second lesson we should draw is that it is unlikely that even the best methods of 
ethics will be simple step-by-step algorithms, which even a computer could be 
programmed to follow. It is true that, in the methodological debates, it is often 
assumed that, if moral philosophy had a method, it would have to be something like a 
set of instructions that anyone could take off the shelf and apply successfully. Yet, as 
the example of the reflective equilibrium method suggests, it is unlikely that any 
method of moral philosophy could be specified at the level of specificity required for 
making it a simpler algorithm. Because of this, I believe that it is more useful to think 
of the appropriate methods of ethics as methods in a much looser sense.  
 
Perhaps we should then think of different types of argumentative strategies – different 
ways of providing support for views – as the genuine methods of ethics. That is, we 
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could think that different ethicists who rely on different kind of implicit assumptions 
in their work, whose explicit arguments begin from different starting points (be they 
the results of empirical sciences, their personal ethical convictions, or results of 
abstract philosophical a priori reasoning), and who employ structurally different types 
of arguments all use different methods of ethics, loosely understood. It is unlikely that 
these actual methods could be captured in terms of simple step-by-step prescriptions, 
because using these methods in new contexts will always require judgment. Yet, 
despite this, we should still be able to observe enough similarities between different 
types of arguments in order to be able to evaluate meaningfully different general ways 
of proceeding.  
 
Finally, insofar as we can identify different methods in the previous looser sense, we 
should resist the idea that all ways of proceeding are equally good. Instead, as I 
suggested above, we should be reflective about the ways in which we do moral 
philosophy. We should pay attention to different kinds of arguments, we should take 
part in the evaluation of different methods and we should be aware of the methods we 
use and willing to defend them when challenged. This is especially true in ethics 
because, as we have seen, it is impossible to distinguish the plausibility of a view 
from the strength of the arguments provided for and against it.  
 
In this situation it is fortunate that, despite how common the two attitudes described 
above are, a lot of important work has been recently done on the methods of ethics. 
Yet, perhaps exactly due to the strength and popularity of those attitudes, many of the 
recent contributions to the methodological debates have failed to receive the attention 
they deserve. Of course, the merits of the reflective equilibrium method continue to be 
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debated and similarly the question of whether the empirical methods of psychology 
and social sciences could be used to make new progress in moral philosophy is 
receiving a lot of attention.2 Yet, much of the important methodological work tends to 
remain more hidden.3 One indication of this is that currently there are no overview 
articles or textbooks that students could use for familiarising themselves with the 
different ways of proceeding in ethics. Similarly there are very few professional 
venues in terms of conferences or bespoke publications that would bring together 
ethicists who take part in the different methodological debates. For these reasons, at 
the moment, it is unfortunately quite difficult to get a sense of how the discipline of 
moral philosophy understands its own methods.  
 
Because of this, I organised two conferences on the ‘New Methods of Ethics’ at the 
University of Birmingham: one in September 2016 and one in January 2017. With the 
help of funding provided by the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the 
College of Arts and Law, I was able to invite some of the key contributors to the 
methodological debates in ethics to these conferences. The amount of submissions I 
received through an open call for abstracts and the quality of these submissions 
similarly showed how much interest there really is for exploring the methods of 
ethics. The purpose of the two conferences was thus to bring together ethicists both 
from different areas of ethics and from different methodological debates so that they 
could discuss together the basic question of how we should do moral philosophy.  
 																																																								2	For comprehensive overviews and lists of references, see Daniels (2016) and Alfano and Loeb 
(2017). 
3 Many recent debates concerning the methodology of moral philosophy have investigated conceptual 
analysis, intuitions about cases, linguistic judgments (about the felicity or truth of various attributions), 
parsimony, anti-theory, the idea that an adequate account must be internal to a practice, and other 
equally interesting topics. 
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The aim of this volume is to disseminate the ideas explored at the two conferences to 
a wider audience. My hope is that the material published here will encourage ethicists 
to become methodologically more self-aware, critical and innovative. I thus hope that 
the interesting methodological debates covered here will also receive more attention 
in the discipline more broadly. Finally, I also hope that the chapters of this volume 
will prompt others to attempt to map the different ways of proceeding in ethics more 
clearly and in a way that could be presented in an accessible way to those who are 
new to moral philosophy. I firmly believe that achieving these aims will help the 
whole community of moral philosophers to make more progress. 
 
The chapters  
The chapters of this volume have been structured under four categories. The first 
three chapters take part in one of the most intensive methodological debates in moral 
philosophy, which is about what role, if any, the empirical methods of psychology 
and social sciences should play in ethical theorising. After this, the next two chapters 
will boldly outline brand new methods: a new first-personal method for doing 
metaethics and a new method for first-order normative ethics based on the idea of 
comparing the authoritativeness of different normative standards. The three chapters 
of the Part 3 will then critically evaluate some of the most influential methods used in 
moral philosophy recently. Finally, the last two chapters of Part 4 will consider the 
question of what role, if any, should our first-order normative intuitions play in the 
evaluation of different metaethical views. That is, these chapters attempt to answer 
the question of whether doing first-order normative ethics is one of the method we 
need to rely on when answering metaethical questions.  
 
	 12	
Part 1: The Prospects of Empirically Informed Ethics 
At the heart of the recent passionate debates concerning the so-called empirical (or 
experimental) ethics have been certain general attempts to debunk our moral beliefs. 
These sceptical arguments proceed in two stages. The debunkers first attempt to 
describe certain general causal mechanisms responsible for how we came to have our 
moral beliefs (such as evolution). At this point, the debunkers have also emphasised 
the fact that our moral intuitions seem to be vulnerable to framing effects (Sinnott-
Armstrong 2008), produced by a ‘quick and dirty’ emotional systems (Greene 2013), 
or widely grounded in reactions of disgust (Kelly 2011). The debunkers then argue 
that these features of our moral beliefs undermine whatever justification we had for 
them because the processes responsible for these beliefs turn out to be unreliable.  
 
In ‘How to Debunk Moral Beliefs’ (Chapter 2), Victor Kumar and Joshua May 
construct a dilemma for the previous kind of general attempts to undermine our moral 
beliefs. According to them, if the debunkers focus on a belief-formation mechanism 
such as evolution that could be responsible for most of our moral beliefs, they will 
struggle to show that this mechanism is unreliable given how many of our moral 
beliefs can also plausible be assumed to be true. To avoid this problem, the debunkers 
can focus on more local belief-formation mechanisms based on disgust and other 
specific emotional reactions or on processes vulnerable to framing. The debunkers 
have a much better chance of showing that the moral beliefs acquired in these ways 
may be undermined. Yet, the trade-off here is that no general sceptical conclusions 
follow – it is always open for those who are not sceptics to argue that most of our 
moral beliefs have not been formed in these ways. Kumar and May thus attempt to 
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argue that there cannot be general sceptical, empirically orientated debunking 
arguments that would be effective enough to challenge all our moral beliefs. 
 
Yet, Kumar and May also describe a new empirically informed method that could be 
employed successfully in more local ethical debates. Here they begin from the 
observation that the so-called ‘consistency reasoning’ is very often used in both 
everyday life and in moral philosophy. This type of reasoning relies on the simple 
idea that we should treat like cases alike. When our consistency is questioned, we 
have two choices: we can either change our view about one of the cases or we can 
explain what the morally relevant difference between the cases is. Kumar and May 
then propose that one useful role which empirical research can play is that it can 
reveal to us what features of different situations make us treat them differently – to 
what we are in fact reacting. After empirical investigation has revealed to us what 
makes us treat the cases we are considering differently, we, of course, need to 
consider whether those factors really make a genuine moral difference. Yet, given that 
it is always possible that we are in fact tracking intuitively irrelevant features, 
empirical investigation can play a significant role in powerful consistency arguments, 
or so Kumar and May argue. 
 
One standard method on which most ethicists rely at some point is testing whether 
different suggested moral principles fit our moral intuitions about various fanciful 
problem cases. These cases are intentionally unrealistic as their purpose is to enable 
us to focus on just few isolated features of the situations. Focusing on these features 
in artificial thought-experiments enables us to test whether our moral principles carve 
the joints of the moral reality at the right places in a way that would be difficult to do 
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in messy real-life situations. One famous example of this type is the Trolley case in 
which a trolley is about to hit five people but you have an option of redirecting it to 
kill only one person.  
 
Yet, recently the epistemic value of these cases for ethical theorising has been 
challenged on empirical grounds (Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012 and 2015; 
Wiegman et al ?). It turns out that, for example, the order in which these cases are 
presented affects what intuitions even professional ethicists have about them and even 
the moral principles they are willing to accept. If the intuitions of ethicists can be 
manipulated this easily, there is a worry that they lack a competence to make the kind 
of reliable judgments about these cases that could offer us an insight to which moral 
principles are correct. 
 
In Chapter 3 ‘Who’s Afraid of Trolleys?’, Antti Kauppinen attempts to defend the 
standard methodology of normative ethics by responding to these debunking 
empirical concerns. Kauppinen first argues that philosophers tend to employ their 
special competences only in theoretical contexts in which they evaluate different 
ethical views and for this reason the previous experimental settings might not prompt 
them to make their best carefully considered convictions. Kauppinen also offers an 
alternative explanation of why the ethicists’ judgments about the cases can be 
influenced be superficial things such as the order in which the cases are presented. 
This is because, in the relevant cases, there are many morally salient considerations 
that need to be taken into account. The order in which the cases are presented can then 
influence the way in which ethicists weigh these complex factors. Finally, Kauppinen 
also considers the ways in which we can attempt to screen off the intuitions that do 
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not illustrate our best moral competences. This can be done, for example, by being 
cautious when relying on uncertain intuitions in theorising and by understanding 
ethical inquiry as a social process in which many of our responses to the individual 
cases continue to be challenged by others in a way that can be corrective. 
 
The third chapter taking part in the methodological debates concerning the role of 
empirical sciences is Tyler Millhouse, Alisabeth Ayars and Shaun Nichols’s 
‘Learnability and Moral Nativism: Exploring Wilde Rules’ (Chapter 4). According to 
moral nativism, evolution has provided us with an innate ‘moral rule acquisition 
capacity’ that enables us to learn moral rules relatively quickly.4 Yet, given that this 
capacity also imposes certain structures on our moral thought, the nativists also accept 
that the capacity must constrain the kind of moral rules we can learn.  
 
If the nativist hypothesis were true, this would have significant consequences for 
many debates in moral philosophy. For example, if we accept metaethical realism and 
think that moral facts are independent of human judgments, nativism seems to entail 
that moral facts could in principle be such that we, as human beings, might not be 
able to learn the moral rules that best capture those facts. Likewise, if we are not 
metaethical realists but rather think that moral facts are in some way mind-dependent, 
then the nativist hypothesis offers us a new empirical way of investigating what the 
moral facts are. In principle, in this framework, we should be able to rule out ethical 
theories by empirically investigating whether the moral rules they entail would be 
learnable by ordinary human beings. Thus, whatever metaethical view we accept, the 
nativist hypothesis seems to have fascinating consequences. 
																																																								
4 For the most systematic presentation of nativism, see Mikhail (2011). 
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Millhouse, Ayars and Nichols, however, argue against the nativist hypothesis based 
on the empirical research they carried out. They begin from a type of moral rules that 
do not exist anywhere in the world. Nativists tend to think that these rules have some 
structural features such that the absence of these rules can be explained by the fact 
that they fail to satisfy the constraints on moral learning set by the innate moral rule 
acquisition capacity. 
 
Millhouse, Ayars and Nichols focus on what they call ‘the Wilde rules’.5 These rules 
both permit agents to bring about an outcome intentionally and forbid agents to bring 
about that very same outcome unintentionally (that is, they prohibit merely allowing 
the outcome to come about). Such rules do not exist in real life: the moral rules we 
have either permit (or forbid) bringing a certain outcome both intentionally and 
unintentionally or they forbid intentionally bringing about an outcome whilst 
permitting merely allowing the outcome to come about.  
 
Chapter 4 then begins from the thought that, if the learning of any moral rules were 
made impossible by the innate structure of the moral rule learning capacity, the Wilde 
rules would surely need to be amongst these rules. Yet, the empirical evidence 
provided by Millhouse, Ayars and Nichols shows clearly that even Wilde rules can be 
learned naturally without any explicit instructions or explanations. This should make 
us sceptical about the nativist hypothesis. Given that we can learn Wilde rules, there 
is no reason to think that any moral rules could have structural features that would 
make them unlearnable because of our innate moral rule capacities. 																																																								
5 They call these rules Wilde rules because of a quote often attributed to Oscar Wilde according to 
which ‘a gentleman never offends unintentionally’ where this rule is taken to imply that intentional 
offending is permitted. 
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In the studies carried out by Millhouse, Ayers and Nichols, the research subjects were 
asked to imagine a foreign culture with the gibberish rule ‘nib weigns’. The subjects 
were then shown examples of violations of the rule. Some participants were given 
only examples that were clearly actions, some only examples that were clear 
allowings, and some both. The subjects were then asked how likely it was that certain 
new cases of actions and allowings were also violations. The results were revealing. 
Firstly, it was shown that the participants who were shown only examples of 
violations that were allowings were naturally able to learn Wilde rules: that is, 
without any instruction or explanation the participants would no longer take actions to 
be violations of the relevant rule. However, the participants also showed a certain bias 
against such rules. The participants shown only allowing examples were more 
inclined to think that also actions were violations than those who were only shown 
action examples were inclined to think that also allowings were violations. Millhouse, 
Ayars and Nichols argue that this bias can be explained in the framework of Bayesian 
accounts of learning – the participants are biased against the Wilde rules because they 
prior expectations of what the rule in question is like has been shaped by the moral 
rules they have encountered.  
 
This chapter makes a number of interesting methodological contributions. Firstly, it 
illustrates with an example what kind of an important role empirical research can play 
in moral philosophy. It shows that many interesting philosophical hypotheses, for 
example, about the way in which moral rules are learned can be empirically tested and 
so there are areas of moral philosophy in which empirical research definitely has a 
role to play. Furthermore, in the light of Millhouse, Ayars and Nichols’s work it does 
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not seem likely that empirical investigation to which moral rules we can learn could 
shed much light on which actions are right and wrong even if we assume some form 
of mind-dependence of moral facts in metaethics. After all, the empirical research 
carried our here suggests that we are flexible learners. 
 
Part 2: New Methods 
Two of the authors of this volume have been ambitious enough to outline genuinely 
new methods of ethics. In her ‘Metaethics from a First-Person Standpoint’ (Chapter 
5), Catherine Wilson begins from the observation that, even if in first-order normative 
ethics the first-person perspective of the agent is often taken seriously (consider, for 
example, the demandingness objections to consequentialism), the nature of 
obligations in metaethics has so far been explored purely from the objective third-
personal perspective. Thus, her aim is to explore whether new progress could be made 
in addressing the question ‘why should I be moral?’ if we began our theorising from 
the first-person standpoint. 
 
The first stage of Wilson’s first-personal method is relatively uncontroversial. During 
the first eight steps of her argument, Wilson lays out clearly from her own first-person 
perspective how she thinks about morality. Her starting point is the idea that she is 
often judgmental and she has, by nature, preferences over most things. She also 
observes how evaluation permeates much of her thinking and language – almost any 
way in which she can describe an object entails something about how good it is. 
 
Wilson then considers how plausible it is to think that some things are better for her 
than others. It is certainly better for her to go on existing right now than it is, for 
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example, to swim in shark-infested waters. Other things being equal, those very same 
things also seem to be better for others too. After this, she is led to consider how she 
can furthermore evaluate different forms of interaction in terms of whether they 
follow the ‘norms of civility’ that facilitate social interaction. Smiling when being 
introduced to someone, for example, is better than eating with mouth open and talking 
at the same time. Yet, these norms also raise new questions in cases in which what is 
good for me conflicts with the demands of the norms: for instance, why should I 
follow the social norms when it requires sacrificing my own interests? Here Wilson 
makes two poignant observations. Firstly, part of why in many cases she is inclined to 
follow the norms is the way in which she has been in the past rewarded for 
compliance. Likewise, she finds it pleasant to see her life run smoothly as a 
consequence of obeying the norms of civility. Yet, she also notes how she is able to 
opt out in some cases for good reasons and often no punishment follows. 
 
At the next, eight step, Wilson finally gets to her moral thinking. She begins by 
considering the content of the corresponding norms of morality. Wilson first 
concludes that morally wrong actions often involve obtaining a benefit to oneself 
whilst at the same time imposing a severe burden on others whereas morally right 
actions tend to involve sacrificing one’s own time and trouble in order to provide a 
benefit to others. In this way, moral norms are just like the norms of civility. Yet, 
there are also two differences: in the case of moral norms, the relevant harms to others 
tend to be more serious and also the moral norms are more universal than the norms 
of civility.  
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So far, Wilson has only described her moral thinking from the first-personal 
perspective. The relevant metaethical question then is: are the norms of morality 
recognised from the first-personal perspective real? Wilson’s methodological claim is 
that thinking about this further question too from the first-personal perspective is 
fruitful. Her claim is that we can make progress in thinking about this question by 
considering the lessons we learnt from concerning first-personally why we should 
follow the norms of civility. 
 
If I do not follow the norms of morality and others spot this, there will be often 
outrage, resentment and even punishments. Likewise, given how ingrained acting 
morally is in us, we similarly get pleasure (in the form of clear conscience) and other 
rewards from acting morally. Yet, from Wilson’s first-personal perspective, these 
recognisable reasons do not seem to exhaust her reasons for following the moral 
norms. The further reasons have nothing to do with carrots and sticks but rather they 
seem to be grounded in our shared human way of life that cannot be captured from an 
external third-personal perspective. As Wilson points out, it is not clear whether from 
such a perspective there would always be reasons to be moral. Wilson thus makes a 
compelling argument to the conclusion that there is metaethical understanding that 
can only be gained through first-personal reflection.  
 
The second genuinely new method of ethics is outlined in Andrew Sepielli’s 
‘Consequentialism and the Evaluation of Action qua Action’ (Chapter 6). Sepielli 
begins from the observation that there are many different standards for evaluating 
actions that range from thinking about which actions are good moves in chess to 
considering what we ought to do overall. The crucial difference between these 
	 21	
standards is that some of them are more authoritative than others. The natural 
question then is: which standards are the most authoritative ones? 
 
Sepielli makes a striking claim in response to this question. He believes that the less 
authoritative standards evaluate the actions qua narrower categories of evaluation 
whereas the more authoritative standards evaluate actions more generally qua actions. 
Thus, for example, the standards of chess are superseded by the standards of overall 
ought because the former standards take into account only the considerations related 
to the goal of winning in chess whereas the latter take into account this consideration 
and also many other considerations, which bear on the evaluated action given all the 
ends we can have. 
 
In order to find the most authoritative standard for evaluating actions, we then need to 
look for a standard that supersedes all others. This standard is the one that is the most 
liberal in terms of which ends and other considerations that are taken into account in 
the evaluation of action. Sepielli then argues that the traditional option – the 
evaluation of actions in terms of what we ought to do overall cannot be the most 
authoritative standard for evaluating actions. This is because there is a more general 
uber-standard, which evaluates actions qua events generally and therefore supersedes 
the standard of the overall ought. After all, the former standard places fewer 
constraints on what is taken into account in the evaluation of action. The overall ought 
limits our focus to what makes an action good one as an action whereas the uber-
standard for evaluating event generally takes this standard into account plus a further 
set of considerations that make any event good or bad irrespective of whether it is an 
action or not.  
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At this point, Sepielli’s view merges into a new method for doing first-order 
normative ethics. In first-order normative ethics, what we are most interested in is 
what the most authoritative standard for evaluating actions tells us to do. This is 
because we think both that moral demands are over-riding in virtue of their 
authoritativeness and that morality must in some way be practical and action-guiding. 
Sepielli thus outlines a two-stage method, which according to him we should apply 
when doing first-order normative ethics. We should first consider which standard of 
evaluating actions is the most authoritative due to the fact that it supersedes all other 
standards by being a more encompassing standard. As we have just seen, if Sepielli is 
right, that standard is the general standard for evaluating actions qua events.  
 
At the second stage, we should then consider what that uber-standard is like. What is 
the way in which we evaluate, for example, how bad different natural disasters (as 
events that are not actions) are?  Here Sepielli argues that the most general standard of 
evaluating events in general is a form of agent-neutral consequentialism that does not 
fetishise agency by making the value of outcomes depend on how they are related to 
the agency of different agents. After all, that form of consequentialism captures the 
way in which we tend to evaluate events that are not actions done by human agents. 
Sepielli thus offers us a new way of understanding how we should do first-order 
normative ethics. We are to consider first which standard of evaluating actions is most 
authoritative and then which types of considerations are taken into account in the 
evaluation of actions by that standard. By applying this method, Sepielli himself is led 
to endorsing a version of agent-neutral consequentialism but, of course, at this point 
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there is room for arguing that the method, when properly applied, should lead us to 
some other first-order ethical view. 
 
Part 3: Evaluations of Recent Methods 
The three chapters of Part 3 all evaluate some of the new methods that have been 
recently used in ethics. Christopher Cowie’s ‘The Similarity Hypothesis in 
Metaethics’ (Chapter 7) is a defence of the recent ‘metanormative’ method in 
metaethics. Its defenders no longer focus on morality but rather investigate reasons 
for actions, beliefs and other attitudes more generally. The metanormative method 
thus accepts the ‘similarity hypothesis’, the idea that all reasons are reasons in the 
same way. That is, according to this assumption, the only difference between reasons 
in different domains is that they count in favour of different attitudes. Some reasons 
count in favour of beliefs whereas others in favour of desires, but there is no 
difference between what it is for those considerations to be reasons for the attitudes 
they support. If this is right, then investigating the relevant qualities of epistemic 
reasons should, for example, also help us to understand moral reasons. 
 
The critics of this methodological approach argue that the similarity hypothesis is 
false because beliefs have a constitutive aim that can explain what it is for a 
consideration to be an epistemic reason whereas the practical attitudes for which there 
are supposed to be practical reasons lack similar constitutive aims. Beliefs aim at 
being true whereas it is not clear what a corresponding aim for, say, a desire could be. 
If beliefs and desires are different in this crucial way, then the metanormative method 
seems to fail: the assumption that epistemic reasons and other reasons are alike would 
turn out to be mistaken. 
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The main aim of Cowie’s chapter is to argue that even the best formulation of the 
previous challenge to the metanormativity method provided by Stephen Darwall 
(2003) fails. In response to the previous objection, it could be suggested that practical 
attitudes such as desires do have constitutive aims: they aim at the good or the 
desirable (that is, a desire is correct if and only if it is a desire for something good).  
Darwall has, however, argued that, even if the aim of beliefs (truth) can ground 
theoretical reasons, the aim of desires (good) cannot do the same because there is an 
important difference between the kinds of aims truth and goodness are. His claim is 
that truth is a substantial aim of beliefs and thereby able to ground theoretical reasons 
whereas goodness is merely a formal aim of desires and hence incapable of grounding 
practical reasons. He thus argues that the aim of truth bears on what we ought to 
believe in a more substantial sense – it makes beliefs responsible to an external 
standard whereas, in contrast, the aim of desires, goodness, fails to do so. This is 
because goodness does not substantially restrict what we ought to desire based on a 
standard that would be external to practical reasoning. Because of this difference, 
Darwall argues that the aim of desire cannot ground practical reasons. 
 
Cowie’s objection to Darwall is based on the claim that a key premise in Darwall’s 
argument can be read in two ways neither of which enables Darwall to reach his 
conclusion. Darwall claims that that the crucial difference between beliefs and desires 
is that, because the aim of desire is merely formal, thinking about what to desire is not 
responsible to an external standard in the same way as belief formation is responsible 
to the standard of truth. Cowie observes that this premise can be read either 
metaphysically or epistemically. Under the metaphysical reading, the premise states 
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that, because the constitutive aim of desire is merely formal, the facts about what you 
ought to desire are such as they are in virtue of you doing some practical reasoning. In 
contrast, under the epistemic reading, the previous premise claims that, because 
desires lack a substantive aim, we can identify what we ought to desire only by 
following the internal norms of practical reasoning.  
 
Cowie’s central objection is that the previous interpretations of the central premise are 
not a problem for the defenders of the metanormative method. The metaphysical 
reading fails simply because the mere fact that desires lack a substantive aim cannot 
entail that what is good and desirable metaphysically depends on the satisfaction of 
the norms of practical reasoning. The epistemic reading, in contrast, cannot ground 
the required contrast between epistemic reasons and practical reasons. This is because 
in the epistemic domain too it is plausible that, in order to identify what we ought to 
believe, we cannot rely on external standards but rather we must follow the norms 
internal to theoretical reason. As a consequence, Cowie concludes that the best 
objection to the metanormative method in metaethics presented so far fails and so we 
should continue pursuing the metanormative project. 
 
In his chapter ‘The That’ (Chapter 8), James Lenman begins by describing two very 
different approaches to ethical theorising. We could call the first method either 
‘voluntarism’ or the ‘way of invention’. That we should use this method seems to 
follow from the fundamental Humean thesis according which our passions – desires, 
plans, cares and concerns – constitute the source of both normativity and moral 
requirements. If this is right, then it seems natural also to think that normative 
theorising too should begin from the previous attitudes. The appropriate method for 
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finding out what is right and wrong would, according to this line of thought, be to first 
discover what we care about. After all, the talk of moral requirements and normativity 
is, on this view, a way of giving voice to our most fundamental concerns.  
 
Lenman calls the second method, which he finds from the works of Iris Murdoch, 
Charles Taylor, and Susan Hurley, ‘the interpretative theory’. This method 
emphasises the importance of the rich conceptual framework of thick evaluative 
concepts, which we inherit through growing up in our linguistic communities. The 
key idea is that, through being embedded in this conceptual framework, we can 
evaluate things in the world but also see, interpret, and understand ourselves too. 
Furthermore, by understanding the world and ourselves through the conceptual 
scheme of thick concepts, we are also able to shape our cares and concerns. This 
process can, furthermore, lead to a better understanding and interpretation of the thick 
conceptual scheme itself, which will then again lead to new, improved interpretations 
of ourselves.  
 
Hence, whereas the first method assumes that the legitimate starting point of our 
moral theorising is what we most fundamentally care about, the second method sees 
ethical theorising to consist of something like an interpretative hermeneutic cycle in 
which the thick evaluations shape our understanding of our world and ourselves, 
which shapes our cares and concerns, which shapes our thick evaluative conceptual 
scheme, etc. Thus, on this view, ethical theorising fundamentally consists of 
interpretation that does not have any Archimedean starting point. 
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Lenman’s central argument then is that, even if the second interpretative method is a 
more plausible description of how ethical theorising proceeds, this is not a reason to 
abandon Humeanism in metaethics. Rather, in addition to being able to accept the 
interpretative theory, the Humeans can also at the same time tame some of the 
metaethical mysteries, which the defenders of the interpretative method have left 
unresolved. The central insight of the interpretative model is that normative thought 
does not begin now. Rather, we gradually become a part of a whole community that 
has deliberated before and through this upbringing many of our community’s 
evaluative commitments become ingrained in us. The claim then is that the thick 
evaluative language has evolved exactly for the purpose of voicing and 
communicating these commitments. The thick concepts thus contain our shared 
practical understanding in the form of cares and concerns that make us members of 
the same community. As we saw above, these concepts enable us to reflect and 
deliberate together which will lead to shaping our concerns in new ways. Thus, on the 
level of epistemology, the interpretative view is correct whereas as at the level of 
metaethics the Humeans can give an account of the attitudes that ground the deep 
evaluations, or so Lenman argues. 
 
The final chapter of this section is Jack Woods’s ‘Footing the Cost (Of Normative 
Subjectivism)’ (Chapter 9). This chapter is a discussion of a method for evaluating 
metaethical theories, which was first described by Philippa Foot (1972). According to 
this method, when we evaluate theories that attempt to describe the nature and content 
of moral judgments, we should not think only of whether the theory in question is 
true. Rather, according to Foot, we should also consider whether understanding our 
own moral judgments in the way suggested by the evaluated metaethical theory would 
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prevent those judgments from satisfying their functional role. The suggestion thus is 
that, if accepting a metaethical view about the nature of our moral judgments would, 
for example, make us stop making moral judgments altogether, then that theory could 
not be correct. 
 
Foot herself applied this method in her argument against different versions of 
metaethical subjectivism and relativism. According to her, if we all started to think 
that what is right and wrong depended in some way on our contingent attitudes 
(which could have been easily different), we might all stop caring about our own 
moral judgments. Because it would be dangerous not to make any moral judgments, 
Foot then thought that we should not accept subjectivism or relativism in metaethics. 
 
Woods begins by accepting the basic assumption behind Foot’s method. He grants 
that metaethical views should be able to capture and make sense of the functional role 
of moral judgments in a way that can support our judgments’ ability to carry out their 
functional role rather than undermine it. Thus, in this respect, Woods’s methodology 
in metaethics is inspired by Foot’s work. Yet, despite this, Woods wants to resist 
Foot’s objection to subjectivism – his aim is to argue that Foot’s method itself does 
not lead to the conclusion that we should reject subjectivism. 
 
Woods’s argument against Foot proceeds in two stages. Firstly, he argues that we 
should try to capture the functional role of moral judgments more carefully that Foot 
did. In the end, the role of these judgments is to enable us to co-ordinate our choices 
and actions in a mutually beneficial way. Fulfilling this function is possible only if we 
can make moral judgments that apply also to other people’s actions. Furthermore, for 
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the moral judgments to be able to play the role of co-ordinating our choices and 
actions, we must be able to disagree with others by making conflicting moral 
judgments. Otherwise, we could not co-ordinate our actions by solving these 
disagreements through rational debates in which we take other people’s views about 
our reasons seriously. It is only against this background that the potential arbitrariness 
of our moral judgments becomes a problem for the subjectivists. If our judgments and 
attitudes genuinely were arbitrary, it would not be clear how such judgments and 
attitudes could be used to persuade others to changes their views in a way that would 
lead to action co-ordination. 
 
In the second stage of his argument, Woods tries to respond to the arbitrariness 
challenge and to show that the subjectivist understanding of our normative judgments 
can support the functional role, which these judgments play. Firstly, the arbitrariness 
concern is supported by the idea that we could easily have wildly different sets of 
cares and concerns. Woods argues against this by defending the idea that our moral 
outlooks are relatively robust. After all, the cares and concerns that constitute our 
moral outlooks are what make us who we are and so being able to imagine having a 
completely different moral outlook would require being able to adopt the standpoint 
of a completely different person from their first-personal perspective. This is not 
something we are able to do easily.  
 
Woods also argues that, even if according to the subjectivist framework we must 
evaluate the actions of others from our own moral standpoint that the objects of our 
evaluation might not share, the resulting judgments can still play the action co-
ordinating functional role of moral judgments. This is because, even if the moral 
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standpoints of those with whom we disagree are different from ours, it is very rare 
that they are completely different. In most disagreements, solving the disagreement 
through rational debate can begin from at least some shared moral cares and concerns. 
If such common ground exists, then it is possible to change one’s view in a moral 
disagreement rationally on the basis of the other’s person’s proposal even if that 
proposal is understood in the subjectivist way as an evaluation made from the 
speaker’s own moral standpoint. As a consequence, Woods claims that, even if the 
method described by Foot is sound, it gives us no reason to reject subjectivist and 
relativist views in metaethics. 
 
Part 4: Metaethics and Normative Ethics 
The last two chapters of this volume, by Pekka Väyrynen (Chapter 10) and Matthew 
Silverstein (Chapter 11), are some of the first systematic attempts to answer a certain 
central methodological question that has always intrigued ethicists. It concerns the 
relationship between normative ethics and metaethics. There are two views about how 
these two domains of ethics are related to one another. On one view these two sub-
fields of the discipline are independent of one another, whereas according to the other 
view they are intertwined areas of investigation. Which one of these views is correct 
will then have important consequences for how we should do research in ethics. If the 
fields are independent, then metaethicists do not need to care about what the correct 
views are in normative ethics (and vice versa), whereas if the fields are intertwined 
then, for example, finding the correct metaethical view will require taking part in 
first-order normative debates about what is right and wrong.  
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One crucial methodological question in ethics thus is: can the central questions of 
first-order normative be answered without taking a stand on metaethical issues and 
likewise is the correct metaethical framework neutral between different first-order 
ethical theories? Or, are the fields intertwined in such a way that normative ethicists 
and metaethics have to be done together at the same time? Even if many ethicists have 
taken a stand on these important methodological questions on the basis of their prior 
commitments in both normative ethics and metaethics, very few philosophers have 
considered these questions systematically. This is why the chapters by Väyrynen and 
Silverstein chapters are so interesting. They also answer the previous questions in 
very different ways. 
 
In his chapter ‘Normative Commitments in Metanormative Theory’ (Chapter 10), 
Väyrynen argues that whether we should accept a given metanormative theory always 
turns on how plausible certain first-order normative assumptions are. If this is right, 
then metaethical inquiry will always also require doing first-order normative 
theorising. Väyrynen’s argument to this conclusion begins from the idea that any 
metaethical view concerning the meaning of normative terms or the nature of 
normative judgments and properties will end up referring to facts that make a 
normative difference according to that view itself. He then argues that any of the 
previous kind of considerations can make a normative difference only if they are 
normatively relevant. From this Väyrynen finally concludes that metaethical theories 
will always commit themselves to first-order normative claims about which features 
are normatively relevant. 
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Väyrynen also carefully illustrates how the previous argument applies to many well-
known metaethical views. For example, consider the synthetic forms of naturalism 
according to which the reference of normative terms is determined by to which 
natural properties these terms are linked with the appropriate kind of causal 
connections. If we accept this view, then we must accept the idea that which natural 
properties causally regulate the use of our normative concepts must make a normative 
difference. After all, here facts about causal regulation will affect which actions are 
right and wrong. As a consequence, this view entails that facts about causal regulation 
must be normatively relevant, which itself is a normative assumption requiring first-
order normative justification at the level of normative ethics. As this example 
illustrates, Väyrynen’s argument has significant consequences for how metaethics 
should be done. If the argument is sound, metaethical theorising will always at least in 
part consist of considering first-order normative and moral questions. 
 
Matthew Silverstein’s chapter ‘Revisionist Metaethics’ (Chapter 11), in contrast, 
argues that in metaethics we should not be too concerned about the question of 
whether the first-order ethical implications of our metaethical views are intuitively 
acceptable. Silverstein first observes that different sides in the central metaethical 
debates tend to accept very different kind methodological principles. He calls those 
who value the explanatory power of metaethical views ‘explainers’ and those who 
value reflective equilibrium with our carefully considered first-order moral 
convictions ‘preservationists’.  Even if, of course, we would ultimately prefer a 
metaethical framework that would do well both explanatorily and extensionally, 
Silverstein sees the previous two methodological starting points to be pulling in 
different directions. Explanatory theories tend to be reductive and make normative 
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properties to depend on our attitudes, whereas extensionally intuitive theories tend to 
be non-reductive and thus able to recognise the kind of external and categorical 
reasons that match our intuitions. 
 
Silverstein then argues that the explainers have a more appropriate methodology than 
the preservationists. This is because he believes that, given that we lack a sufficiently 
firm understanding of the subject matter of ethics, we should not care too much about 
the extensional adequacy of our theories. Silverstein then supports this main line of 
reasoning in two ways. 
 
Firstly, Silverstein agrees with Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) and G.E.M. Anscombe 
(1958) that our moral vocabulary is historically based on a legalistic and theistic 
conception of ethics, which tends to understand right and wrong in terms of God’s 
commands. Since we have abandoned the religious moral framework, we have, of 
course, made attempts to restructure our conceptual framework in a way that would 
not depend on God. Silverstein then suggests that, even if we should do moral 
philosophy in this new situation in which we are in the midst of revising our 
conceptual framework, we should still be sceptical about those elements of our moral 
practice that bear the closest traces of its religious and legalistic origins. One such 
element is the common thought that our moral judgments are universal – the intuition 
that these judgments apply to all agents independently of what they care about.  
 
Silverstein’s second argument begins from the idea that reasons must be essentially 
connected to practical reasoning. After all, reasons are considerations that bear on 
successful reasoning at least in some way. According to Silverstein, this means that 
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we should trust our intuitions about reasons only insofar as we understand the process 
of practical reasoning and what its constitutive aim is. He, however, thinks that we do 
not really understand practical reasoning. We know that its formal aim is to tell us 
what to do, but unfortunately, at the moment, we do not really know what the more 
substantial goals of practical reasoning would be. This is why Silverstein thinks that 
we should accept that at least some of our intuitions concerning what reasons we have 
will be wide off the mark. He also believes that, as a consequence, we should not rely 
on our substantial first-order intuitions about what reasons in evaluating those 
metaethical theories that have a lot of explanatory power. We should not be 
preservationists but rather explainers. 
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